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COMMENT

COMMENTS ON ROOKER-FELDMAN OR LET STATE
LAW BE OUR GUIDE
Jack M. Beermann*
I feel privileged to have been asked to be a commentator on the
three principal papers in this symposium. These are three excellent
papers, and although there has been some valuable commentary on
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, there will be no need to go beyond these
papers to gain a full appreciation of the doctrine, its applications, and
its problems, which run as deep as the problems of any doctrine.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is an oddity in the law. In fact, I
have been unable to think of another legal doctrine that lacks both a
clear role and a clearjustification. The lack of ajustification is tied to
the lack of a clear role. Because the vast majority of cases that could
be barred under Rooker-Feldman are already barred by other, more
firmly established doctrines, Rooker-Feldmanappears unnecessary. Further, in the remaining cases which are barred under Rooker-Feldman
but not by another, related doctrine, the result appears to be undesirable and the cases should actually be allowed to go forward, whether
for the reasons underlying the inapplicability of the other, more
firmly established doctrines, or more specifically because Rooker-Feldman is not based upon a sensible reading of the statutes regulating the
jurisdiction of the federal courts.
To illustrate how odd the place occupied by Rooker-Feldman is,
consider two important articles involving the doctrine, albeit both in
its pre-Feldmandays when it was know simply as Rooker. In 1978, David
Currie urged a rediscovery of the res judicata defense, arguing that
the Rooker doctrine was not broad enough to cover all the situations in
which federal court relitigation of issues decided in state court should
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. Thanks to Ron Cass, Bill
Ryckman, and Ward Farnsworth for allowing me to bore them with my harangues on
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine during the preparation of this Comment.
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be barred.1 Then, just two years later, Williamson Chang argued that
Rooker should be understood as an aspect of res judicata. 2 Thus in a
space of two years, the forgotten defense is remembered and should
encompass its previously less-neglected cousin.
Twenty years later, the papers in this symposium find a landscape
altered more in form than in substance. The Supreme Court, having
applied Rocker to prevent Marc Feldman 3 from challenging (in federal
district court) the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' refusal to
waive the requirement that he attend an ABA-accredited law school
before being admitted to the D.C. bar, has failed to clarify the contours of the doctrine. While Justice Scalia's concurrence in the
Pennzoil case indicates that at least some members of the Court continue to believe that Rooker-Feldman is jurisdictional, 4 the Court's most
recent reference is to the "Rooker/Feldman abstention doctrine,"5 in1 See David P. Currie, ResJudicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 317,
321-25 (1978).
2 See Williamson B.C. Chang, Rediscovering the Rooker Doctrine: Section 1983, Res
Judicataand the Federal Courts, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1337 (1980).

3 Marc Feldman did not attend law school. Rather, he studied law in the office
of an attorney in Virginia, audited courses at the University of Virginia School of Law,
and served for six months as a law clerk to a United States District Judge. He then
passed the Virginia bar examination and was admitted to the Virginia bar. He was
also admitted to the Maryland bar after that state waived its requirement that applicants for the bar attend an ABA-accredited law school. In Maryland, he worked as a
staff attorney for a legal aid bureau. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals refused to waive its requirement that applicants attend ABA-accredited schools. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 465-68 (1983). Marc
Feldman later became a law professor at Rutgers, Camden, where he taught ConTorts, an innovative combination of traditional first year Contracts and Torts courses.
From what I understand, this innovation ultimately led or contributed to his departure from the Rutgers faculty, which he left to become director of a legal aid bureau
in Fresno, California. After several years there, Feldman returned to academia, becoming a professor at Maryland Law School. While at Maryland, he remained active
in legal services matters. Professor Feldman died in 1998. While I did not know Professor Feldman, I know that he is missed by many colleagues and students.
4 See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 18 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia concurred only to state that Texaco's claim was not barred by RookerFeldman. The best explanation for why Justice Scalia bothered to file this opinion is
that since, in his view, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional, it had to be
reached before the Court could properly decide the abstention question that was the
basis for the Court's decision, since abstention presumes jurisdiction.
5 SeeJohnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005 (1994) (Souter, J.) (stating that
the State "contends instead that the . . . challenge deserved dismissal under this
Court's Rooker/Feldman abstention doctrine") (emphasis added). It is unclear
whether the abstention reference was considered or inadvertent.
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dicating that support for the jurisdictional view of Rooker-Feldman may
be eroding.
The most striking development in recent years is, as Suzanna
Sherry reports, the sheer number of lower court decisions in which
Rooker-Feldmanhas been employed to dismiss cases. 6 This is in marked
contrast to the paucity of references to Rooker-Feldman in the Supreme
Court, which, despite the confusion in the lower courts, has not chosen to review Rooker-Feldman cases on certiorari.
In my view, the widespread use of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is
linked to the Court's relatively recent fixing of the rules of preclusion
under the Full Faith and Credit statute. 7 Under that statute, federal
courts are required to accord state judgments the same preclusive ef8
fect as would the courts of the rendering state-no more, no less. It
is the "no more" that creates, in the eyes of some federal courts, the
need for Rooker-Feldman. Before the Supreme Court prohibited it,
there were some federal courts that gave state judgments greater
preclusive effect than they would receive in the state courts.9 As is
6 See Suzanna Sherry, JudicialFederalism in the Trenches: The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine in Action, 74 NorRE DAME L. REv. 1035, 1088 (1999).

7 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
8

See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 384

(1985); Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 88 (1984) (WhiteJ.,
concurring) (citations omitted).
9 In Maresse, the Seventh Circuit, en banc, accorded a judgment of an Illinois
court greater preclusive effect than the state courts would have recognized. See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1984)
(en banc), rev'd, 470 U.S. 373 (1985). Judge Flaum's concurring opinion was the
most interesting because in the course of arguing that federal courts are free to afford
greater preclusive effect to statejudgments than the state court would allow, he stated
in the published slip opinion that "the Supreme Court has never held that a federal
court may not give a state courtjudgment greaterpreclusive effect than the courts of
that state would give it." See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons,
Nos. 81-2671, 83-2683, 26 (7th Cir. 1984) (Flaum, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). Then, less than three weeks later, the Supreme Court decided Migra, in which
Justice White noted: "In Union & Planters"Bank v. Memphis, 189 U.S. 71, 75 (1903),
this Court held that a federal court 'can accord [a state judgment] no greater efficacy'
than would the judgment-rendering State. That holding has been adhered to on at
least three occasions since that time." Migra, 465 U.S. at 88 (White, J., concurring)
(citing Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 7-8 (1940);
Wright v. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co., 216 U. S. 420, 429 (1910); City of Covington v.
First National Bank, 198 U.S. 100, 107-09 (1905)). Rather than reverse himself,
Judge Flaum amended his concurring opinion to state that "the Supreme Court in
Kremer did not hold that a federal court may not give a state court judgment greater
preclusive effect than the courts of that state would give it." Marrese,726 F.2d at 1163.
That statement was true, because greater preclusive effect was not the issue in Kremer,
andJudge Flaum apparently purposely ignored direct Supreme Court precedent con-
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often the case, after one avenue is closed, good lawyers don't give up,
they look for another avenue, and the lower federal courts apparently
found in the Rooker-Feldman doctrine a route to giving state judgments
greater preclusive effect in federal court than they would receive in
state court.
Understood this way, Rooker-Feldman is an (illegitimate) expansion of preclusion rules.1 0 Rooker-Feldman allows a federal court to give
greater preclusive effect to a state courtjudgment because the characterization of the federal claim as an appeal is a matter of federal, not
state, law. But even if this characterization is resisted, and Rooker-Feldman is genuinely about preventing disappointed state court litigants
from "appealing" their cases into the federal system, the distinction
between Rooker-Feldman as a preclusion doctrine and Rooker-Feldman as
a jurisdictional doctrine ultimately collapses.
Consider Rocker" itself. In that case, the federal plaintiff sought
to enjoin, on grounds of constitutional violations, enforcement of an
Indiana state court judgment in a case in which she was a plaintiff.
The plaintiff had appealed to the Supreme Court of Indiana and then
tried to start over again in the federal district court, which the
Supreme Court of the United States held was an improper attempt to
appeal the judgment from the state supreme court to the federal district court.' 2 But why isn't it fair to characterize this as an original
action in equity? Much of the history of equity involves suits in equity
to enjoin enforcement of the judgment of a court of law allegedly
rendered in violation of some equitable doctrine. 1 3 Thus, rather than
dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction, perhaps the Rocker Court should have
4
held that the complaint stated no basis for equitable relief.'
trary to his opinion in order to give greater preclusive effect to a state courtjudgment
than would the courts of the state. This type ofjudicial conduct is almost enough to
turn one into a crit.
10 The Fifth Circuit apparently recognizes this and has a rule prohibiting the application of Rooker-Feldman unless the state court would bar the second action. See
Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 376 (5th Cir. 1995); Gauthier v. Continental Diving
Servs., Inc., 831 F.2d 559, 561 (5th Cir. 1987).
11 Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
12 See id. at 416.
13 Perhaps, as the Court in Rookerhinted, federal equity relief from the judgment
would have been available if the court of law had acted without jurisdiction over the
subject matter or parties. See id. at 416 (denying that the complaint can be fairly
characterized as alleging that the state court judgment was void for having been rendered without jurisdiction).
14 The Court might also have relied upon preclusion, since there is no indication
that Rooker, having sued in state court, did not raise or could not have raised her
federal claims in state court.
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Consider next the decision of the Supreme Court of Nevada in
Nevada IndustrialDevelopment, Inc. v. Benedetti.15 In that case, the court
held that equitable relief against enforcement of a Nevada court's
judgment for damages was available because the judgment was based
6
on a mistake and enforcement would result in unjust enrichment.'
The court allowed an original equitable action in the Nevada trial
court because the time for filing a motion for relief from judgment
had expired. 17 This is a surprising reading of the importance of the
time limits in the rule on relief from judgments, because it allows the
exact same attack in an original action after the time limit expires
under the relief from judgment procedure. But the important point
for Rooker-Feldman purposes is that it allows an original action in equity
to attack a prior judgment, which appears consistent with general equity practice.' 8
Before turning to the papers before us, I want to sketch a minimalist view of Rooker-Feldman, in which the overlap with preclusion
may be less than in more expansive understandings of the doctrine.
In my view, if there is a place for Rooker-Feldman, it is as an abstention
doctrine under which disappointed state court litigants may not go to
federal district court to complain about harm they suffered at the
hands of state courts when the state courts would not entertain the
action or where there is substantial doubt over whether the state court
would entertain the action. Because I believe that § 1983 should be
an exception to Rooker-Feldman,19 my version of Rooker-Feldmanmay apply mainly in diversity cases in which no constitutional claims are
raised against the outcome in the state courts.
There are two related normative bases for this narrow abstention
doctrine. The first reason is that the choice of a federal forum should
not ordinarily significantly affect the outcome of a case in a way that is
detectable ex ante so that forum shopping would result.2 0 If a state

court would allow an independent action collaterally attacking ajudgment, so should a federal court, assuming jurisdictional requirements
are met. On the other hand, if state courts would bar the collateral
attack, or require any attack to be brought in the rendering court as a
motion to reopen the judgment, then the federal court action should
15 741 P.2d 802 (Nev. 1987).
16 See id at 804.
17 See id. at 804-05.
18 Whether the substantive bases for equitable relief are met is a matter wholly
separate from jurisdiction.
19 See infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
20 This is obviously consistent with both the Erie doctrine and with current rules
regarding the preclusive effects of state court judgments in federal court.
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not be available because otherwise forum shopping might result. The
second reason is that, insofar as the state requires any collateral attack
on ajudgment to be made as a motion for relief from thejudgment in
the same forum that issued the judgment, federal courts (and other
state courts) ought to respect that requirement as part of the state's
rules regarding the sanctity of judgments. More generally, federal
courts should treat state judgments the same way that state courts
would treat them.
To illustrate this, assume the following case. A sues B (a private
employer) in state court for wrongful discharge. A loses. A then sues
B on the same claim in federal court. In my view, Rooker-Feldman has
no relevance because it is simply A trying to get two bites at the apple,
suing twice over the same conduct but not trying to attack or appeal
the judgment in the earlier case.
Now suppose that after losing in state court A sues B in federal
court under diversity jurisdiction on the same claim, and also sues the
state judge alleging fraud or conspiracy in the state proceedings, and
asks for damages due to those violations. In addition to preclusion of
the wrongful termination claim, this is potentially a Rooker-Feldman
case because the claim against the state judge is directly aimed at the
state court proceedings. The federal court might wish to abstain from
hearing the claims against the judge, due to potential friction with the
state court system and uncertainty over whether the state courts would
entertain a similar action or require a motion for relief from judgment or an appeal of the judgment as the only methods for attacking
the judge's handling of the case.
The basic idea to me is that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine has no
application when the complaint in federal court is about conduct
outside of the state court, because it is inaccurate to characterize such
a claim as an appeal from the state court's judgment. It may be an
attempt to relitigate, but it is not an appeal. However, when the federal complaint attacks the state courtjudgment as based, for example,
on erroneous procedural or substantive rulings or wrongful conduct
by the judge and opposing parties leading to the judgment, then the
question arises whether a federal court should hear such a case. If
such a claim would be heard as an equity action in state court, then I
do not see any jurisdictional bar to the federal case, but if there was
uncertainty over whether a state court would allow the collateral attack on a state judgment, then there may be grounds for abstention
since the choice of a federal forum should not ordinarily provide the
plaintiff with a method for attacking a judgment not known under
state law. Rooker-Feldman becomes a very narrow abstention doctrine,
especially if it does not apply at all in § 1983 cases.
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Suzanna Sherry's central point appears to be her acceptance of
Rooker-Feldman's jurisdictional status on the ground that Rooker-Feldman is about courts in a dual system while other doctrines, like preclusion, are more focused on the interests of the parties than on the
interests of the courts involved. 2 ' Sherry then makes the very interesting point that Rooker-Feldman serves the same purpose when a federal
case follows a state case that an injunction against suit serves when a
state case follows a federal case. 22 Sherry's point is that because state
courts may not protect themselves by enjoining federal courts, federal
courts apply Rooker-Feldman as a doctrine of self-restraint, a sort of in23
junction against themselves.
The virtue of Sherry's analysis here is that it places the stress exactly on the point where it should be, as a doctrine born of federalism,
distinguishing Rooker-Feldmanfrom preclusion, which would be necessary even if there were only one court system. However, this does not
distinguish Rooker-Feldman from abstention, which also exists only because of the dual nature of our judicial system. 24 Abstention also appears to protect courts rather than parties, and it is not jurisdictional.
Assuming for the moment that Rooker-Feldman serves the courtprotective role as the sort of self-injunction Sherry describes, why is
the characterization of the federal action as appellate in nature a matter of federal, not state, law? If the purpose is to protect the state
courts, why not apply state law to determine whether relitigation
should be allowed? Presumably, the rules state courts set for relitigation in their own courts are viewed by those courts as sufficient to
protect them against the evils of relitigation. For instance, suppose in
Rocker that Indiana law allowed a disappointed state court plaintiff
with a legal claim to seek equitable relief from a final judgment in a
trial court. 25 Why shouldn't the federal court respect the state court's

characterization of the claim as within the jurisdiction of a trial court,

21 See Sherry, supra note 6, at 1101.
22 See itd at 1105.
23 See id.
24 I am focusing mainly on cases in which the litigation in state court has been
concluded. Abstention doctrines and federal statutes such as the Anti-Injunction Act
seem adequate to take care of cases in which a federal plaintiff asks for an injunction
against an ongoing state proceeding.
25 The alternatives to a new action in the trial court include an appeal from the
original judgment and a supplemental proceeding under the original case, such as a
motion for relief from judgment, neither of which may state a claim as an original
action in either state or federal trial courts.
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just as the federal court is required to respect the state decision not26to
bar the subsequent equitable action under preclusion principles?
The federal characterization could lead to curious results. Imagine the following scenario: in Case 1, A sues B for damages in state
court. B loses and is ordered to pay damages to A, and the award is
upheld on appeal. In Case 2, B files an injunctive claim in the same
state's trial court alleging state and federal grounds for enjoining enforcement of the judgment in Case 1, and Case 2 is clearly within the
state court's equity jurisdiction. A then removes Case 2 to federal
court on both federal question and, because the parties live in different states and the judgment is for more than $75,000, diversity
grounds. Under Rooker-Feldman, the federal court should remand this
case to the state court because it would be considered an appeal of the
original state courtjudgment, even though under the hypothetical the
state trial court would hear it as a proper original action under state
law.
Thus, insofar as Rooker-Feldman bars cases that would not be
barred under state preclusion law, the question under Sherry's analysis appears to boil down to whether state courts need special protection from federal courts when states would allow the second case to
proceed in their own courts. I do not understand why state courts
cannot be trusted to make rules adequate to protect themselves. One
would expect the opposite tendency, that states would be overprotective, and thus federal courts might be justified in being less protective
if necessary to protect federal rights. In fact, while the Supreme Court
has not been shy about allowing state judgments to preclude federal
claims, 27 it has raised the possibility that under extreme circumstances
federal courts would be justified in creating or recognizing exceptions
to § 1738 and not affording state court judgments as much preclusive
28
effect as would the state courts.
26 The state court might bar the new claim based on preclusion. The federal
court would respect this decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, and Rooker-Feldman would
not be necessary.
27 See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996) (allowing
judgment on state class action settlement to preclude federal securities claims that
could not have been raised in the state court).
28 See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 386
(1985) (allowing for possibility that federal courts would afford a state court judgment less preclusive effect than the rendering state court would if necessary to protect
federal interests); see also M/atsushita,516 at 380-86 (raising, but rejecting, possibility
that federal jurisdictional statute partially repealed § 1738 so that state court judgment would not be given preclusive effect where federal claim could not have been
raised in state court).
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Another possible reason for relying on federal law to determine
whether an action is original or appellate might be that state law
would be too varied or complex, and a simpler federal rule would be
easier to apply and would add uniformity. I don't see why these particular state rules would be too difficult for federal courts to apply.
Given that federal courts are already required to apply state preclusion rules to determine the preclusive effect of state court judgments,
there is no reason to believe that it would be especially difficult for
federal courts to apply state requirements regarding whether a new
action is appropriate.
As far as I can tell, Sherry does not offer an adequate explanation
for the federalization of this aspect of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
She does suggest that preclusion rules are difficult to apply, 29 but as
the papers in this symposium illustrate, Rooker-Feldmanis also very difficult to apply, especially when federal courts attempt to discern
whether the federal claim is "inextricably intertwined" with claims resolved by a prior state court judgment. 30
Thus, while Sherry's paper laudably directs attention to the pure
federalism reason for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine-that some substitute may be necessary for the injunction against suit that federal
courts can issue when state court litigation threatens a federal judgment-she does not explain why state law itself, applied by the federal
courts, is not up to the task. Perhaps due to my suspicion that RockerFeldman is just a way for federal courts to afford state judgments
greater preclusive effect than would the rendering states, I am drawn
to idea that federal courts, if they insist on maintaining ajurisdictional
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, should mimic state courts as much as possible, and hold that an action is outside federal jurisdiction only if the
state court rendering the judgment would view a subsequent action in
state court as an impermissible collateral attack on the judgment.
This doctrine might be less about jurisdiction than about whether the
plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief should be granted, but it
appears to me that it would be better than Rooker-Feldman at vindicating the state courts' interest in protecting their judgments.
I can imagine a couple of additional reasons why it might not be
wise to rely upon state law to determine whether an original action
that might have the effect of attacking ajudgment should be allowed.
Perhaps such cases simply do not arise in state court because litigants
who are happy to remain in state court, or who have no colorable
basis for federal jurisdiction, use state posjudgment procedures be29
30

See Sherry, supra note 6, at 1107.
Id at 1108-11.
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cause they know an original action in state court would be improper.
A motion in federal court to reopen a state court judgment would
obviously be rejected out of hand, so an original federal district court
action is the only plausible avenue into federal court. Sherry points
out that preclusion rules are easy to avoid because federal plaintiffs
know they can simply add a party to the federal case (for example, the
state judge whose action allegedly violated the federal plaintiff's federal rights).31 Similarly, federal plaintiffs would find ingenious methods for avoiding state law on attacking judgments. Further, perhaps
state judgments are more threatened by federal court review than by
review in their own courts where the judges may have greater sympathy for the sanctity of state judgments. While I find some merit in
these arguments, I do not find them convincing. On the first argument, if state court litigants know when they may not begin an original action in state court, the federal courts should be able to figure
that out as well. On the second point, I don't see why state courts will
not be able to plug holes in their doctrines-if they cannot, perhaps
there is a reason why they shouldn't. Finally, the reverse parity argument, that federal courts will not be sensitive to state interests, ignores
the fact that federal courts are already entrusted with protecting state
interests under preclusion rules and that, under the current expansive
version of Rooker-Feldman, federal courts are expected to protect those
interests without guidance from state law. If they can do it on their
own, adding state law as a tool should not hinder them.
Thus, while on Sherry's account Rooker-Feldman appears to be

based on the purest of federalism concerns, insofar as it rejects state
law as its basis it has not been adequately justified. If a state court
would allow a new action that might attack or frustrate a state court
judgment, then there does not seem to be an adequate reason for not
allowing the same action to go forward in federal court, assuming all
other prerequisites of federal jurisdiction are met and no other doctrine, such as abstention, bars the action.3 2 The best argument for a
31 See id at 1093.
32 An analogy that comes to mind here is the expansion of the domestic relations
exception to federal jurisdiction to cover cases beyond the granting of divorce, alimony, or child support. In attempting to decide whether a particular action was
within thatjurisdictional exception, courts have looked to state law and stated that the
domestic relations exception applies whenever the state courts would require that the
claim be brought in the family court system as part of a domestic relations proceeding. See Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that a claim for
wrongful interference with custody is not within domestic relations exception); see also
Friedlander v. Friedlander, 149 F.3d 739, 740 (7th Cir. 1998) ("The penumbra of the
exception consists of ancillary proceedings, such as a suit for the collection of unpaid
alimony, that state law would require be litigated as a tail to the original domestic
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purely federal rule is that Rooker-Feldman is based upon an interpretation of federal statutes, which of course should be decided under federal law. However, in reality, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine has moved
far from its statutory moorings and cannot be justified purely as a
reading of those statutes.
Sherry raises another very interesting aspect of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine-the implications of the fact that while the Supreme Court
held that Feldman could not challenge the D.C. court's refusal to
waive its bar admission rules, he could challenge the constitutionality
of the rule itself in federal court.33 The Supreme Court held that
Feldman was not, in the latter case, challenging judicial action and
that the general challenge was not inextricably intertwined with the
denial of the waiver request. 3 4 The problem, Sherry points out, is that
many litigants will lack standing to challenge a general rule if a final
judgment makes them ineligible to gain any benefit from an invalida35
tion of the general rule.

Ironically, this linkage between Rooker-Feldman and standing rules
means that in some circumstances Rooker-Feldman will not apply when
there is a threat to a state judgment, but will apply when there is no
threat to the state judgment at all. Take Feldman's case. If his general challenge to the District of Columbia bar admission rule was successful, presumably he would reapply for membership to the bar and
the D.C. court would be required to admit him. I am assuming that
implicit in the Supreme Court's holding that his general challenge
was not barred was a finding that he had standing to bring it, and the
only basis for standing would be admission to the bar if the general
relations proceeding."). The domestic relations exception may also be another example of lower courts excluding more cases from federal jurisdiction than the Supreme

Court finds appropriate. AsJudge Posner acknowledged in Friedlander,"[a] dictum in
[Ankenbrandt v. Richards,504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992)] might be thought to cast doubt on
the existence of the penumbra: 'the domestic relations exception encompasses only
cases involving the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree.'" Friedlander, 149 F.3d at 740 (comparing Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704). The Seventh Cir-

cuit dismissed this statement as a dictum because "the issue of the outer bounds of the
exception, and hence of what we are calling its penumbra, was not remotely before
the Court; for the case, brought by a mother against her divorced husband on behalf
of their children for physical and sexual abuse, lay far outside any plausible conception of the penumbra." Id. It is an interesting question, albeit for another day, what
respect lower courts should accord Supreme Court dicta characterizing judge-made
jurisdictional doctrines.
33 See Sherry, supra note 6, at 1108.
34 See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486-88

(1983).
35 See Sherry, supra note 6, at 1110.

1220

NOTRE DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

74:4

challenge prevailed. The Supreme Court's ruling rejects the argument that his general challenge is inextricably intertwined with his
waiver claim.3 6 Now take a case in which Rooker-Feldman is generally
held to apply-a federal claim brought by a disciplined attorney who
claims that his particular discipline and the state disciplinary rule or
procedure is unconstitutional. The reason that the claims are held to
be inextricably intertwined is that the only way the disciplined attorney stands to gain from the invalidation of the rule is if his prior discipline is reversed, but attacking that in the federal court is an
impermissible appeal of the state judgment.37 In any case, I do not
see what Rooker-Feldman adds to standing analysis and preclusion. The
challenge to the particular disciplinary decision would be barred
under preclusion rules, and the attorney would lack standing to challenge the rule itself unless he could show that he was likely to be subject to further discipline for future violations of the rule.
Finally, in my view the example that Sherry's paper ends with, of a
38
case that she thinks should be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
helps illustrate what I find troublesome about the doctrine, especially
its purely federal law aspect. Sherry recounts a case in which a state
plaintiff sued a defendant for breach of a contract which I would characterize as a license to allow cattle to cross the state defendant's property. 39 The defendant argued that the contract was without
consideration because the fees were not paid (a bad argument since
consideration doctrine requires only a promise, not an actual payment), and the defendant counterclaimed for the fees. 40 The defendant's problem was that the right to collect the fees had been assigned
away, so the state court dismissed the counterclaim. The plaintiff won
in state court for both specific performance and damages for the past
violations. Then the state defendant was reassigned the right to collect the fees and sued in federal court under diversity jurisdiction for
them. The federal court dismissed on both Rooker-Feldman and preclusion grounds.
36 He may have had a preclusion problem: the Supreme Court left that issue to
the lower court on remand. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 487-88.
37 Some disciplined attorneys may have standing to challenge the rules under
which they were disciplined if they would like to continue to disobey the rules. For
example, an attorney disciplined for unethical advertising might have standing to
challenge future applications of the advertising rule if she intended to run similar
advertisements in the future.
38 See Sherry, supra note 6, at 1126-28 (discussing Canal Capital Corp. v. Valley
Pride Pack, Inc., No. 97-CV-2162 (D.Minn. Feb. 20, 1998), rev'd, No. 98-1892, 1999 WL
89007 (8th Cir. Feb. 22, 1999)).
39 See id.
40 See id.
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In support of applying Rooker-Feldman to the case, Sherry states
that the application of preclusion was uncertain because of the dismissal of the counterclaim for fees. 41 Sherry says that this was a perfect
case for Rooker-Feldman because a victory for the state defendant on
the fees claim would nullify the plaintiffs victory in the underlying
suit.42 If the damages awarded to the state plaintiff took account of
the fact that no fees were paid for some period during which the path
was open, then Sherry is correct that a federal judgment for the full
amount of the fees would be in conflict with the state court judgment.
However, if the state court refused, because of the assignment, to consider whether the fees had been paid, the state defendant may never
have had an opportunity to litigate the issue of how much the state
plaintiff owed in fees, and a federal court order to pay the fees for the
period that the path was open would not nullify the state court
judgment.
To understand the ramifications of Sherry's approach to RookerFeldman, think about Sherry's response if the federal suit had been
brought by the actual holder of the right to collect the fees. Sherry's
acceptance of a purely federal and jurisdictional Rooker-Feldman doctrine allows her to propose a significant expansion of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, to cases brought by nonparties to the state court
litigation. 43 Sherry would probably bar the claim of the right holder
under Rooker-Feldman even though the right holder was not a party to
the state court suit. In her view, the party should have intervened in
the state court suit44 and, having failed to do so, has no complaint if a
subsequent federal court suit is not available.
This seems to me to be a radical proposal that potentially would
create a complicated set of rules requiring nonparties to intervene in
numerous situations to preserve their rights. Normally, if a party
wants to be certain that all interested nonparties are bound by ajudgment, it is the party's responsibility to bring them into the case. In
terms of Rooker-Feldman, if the state court would allow the nonparty to
bring an action that might undo some of the victor's gains in the first
state case, there does not seem to be any special reason for the federal
court to require the nonparty to intervene in order to preserve a federal forum that would otherwise be available. Again, Sherry has not
41 See Sherry, supra note 6, at 1128.
42 See id. at 1127.
43 Seeidcat1114.
44 Sherry argues that Rooker-Feldman should be available to bar nonparties and
that nonparties with an interest in a case that may be threatened by a state court
judgment should be required to intervene to protect their interest. See id. at 1112-23.
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offered a sufficient reason for a special rule when the second case is
brought in federal, and not state, court.
In more straightforward Rooker-Feldman terms, if the state defendant was not the owner of the right to collect the fees and if the state
court explicitly refused to decide issues regarding the fees, then the
federal claim for the fees would not in any sense be an "appeal" from
the state court judgment. Sherry's proposal, viewed from this angle,
appears to be an effort for federal courts to supervise the mandatory
party practice of the state courts by conditioning federal jurisdiction,
in some cases, on a federally approved mandatory intervention rule.
Sherry has not articulated a federal interest sufficient to support this
substantial change.
In sum, if preclusion under state law would not bar the claim and
would allow a subsequent suit for damages (and not require a motion
to reopen the original judgment), then I see no reason for a federal
court sitting in diversity to refuse to hear a case that would be heard
by the state court. It seems to me that the best policy in diversity cases
is for federal courts to imitate state courts as much as possible unless
there is a strong federal reason not to. Here, since the reason for the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine is purportedly to protect the state courts, it
seems to present the strongest claim that the federal courts should
mimic the state courts. I therefore do not find that Sherry has made
the case for a robust Rooker-Feldman doctrine as a substitute for an injunction against suit issued by a state court against a federal court.
Barry Friedman and Jim Gaylord's paper 45 starts with a premise
similar to Sherry's, that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine seems to overlap
so greatly with other doctrines, namely preclusion and abstention,
46
that one important question is whether the doctrine is superfluous.
They part company in that Sherry finds a far greater need for RookerFeldman than Friedman and Gaylord because Sherry is concerned that
without Rooker-Feldman there will be too much relitigation of claims
that were or should have been raised in prior state court
47
proceedings.
This difference between Friedman and Gaylord and Sherry arises
from Friedman and Gaylord's search for a normative basis for RockerFeldman. For Friedman and Gaylord, the question concerning the legitimacy of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine boils down to a search for a
case that would be barred by Rooker-Feldman and no other doctrine,
45

Barry Friedman & James E. Gaylord, Rooker-Feldman, From the Ground Up, 74

NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1129 (1999).

46
47

See id. at 1129-30.
See, e.g., Sherry, supra note 6, at 1094.
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and where there is a legitimate federal jurisdictional reason for barring the claim. 48 An easy Rooker-Feldman illustration is as follows: one
limitation on preclusion doctrine is that a nonparty is almost never
bound by ajudgment and thus if one plaintiff sues in state court and
loses, a second plaintiff is normally free to sue on the same claim in
either state or federal court, assuming other jurisdictional prerequisites are met. While Sherry sees a proper place for the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine to block the second plaintiff from suing in federal court, for
Friedman and Gaylord it is illegitimate because there is no legitimate
basis in the law of federal jurisdiction for this form of nonparty
49
preclusion.
This insistence on a normative basis for Rooker-Feldmanin the law
of federal jurisdiction presents an intuitively attractive basis for analyzing and ultimately in large part rejecting the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
As Friedman and Gaylord explain, it turns out that in the vast majority
of Rooker-Feldman applications, either Rooker-Feldman adds nothing to
existing doctrine or it bars cases in situations that have been explicitly
rejected for generalizable reasons under another doctrine, either pre50
clusion or jurisdiction.
Sharing Friedman and Gaylord's suspicion of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, I find the approach attractive, but ultimately I am skeptical
that their approach adds much to our ability to evaluate Rooker-Feldman applications. The problem is how to identify a legitimate federal
jurisdictional reason for the doctrine. 5 ' One tempting idea might be
to argue that Rooker-Feldmanshould not ever bar a claim when barring
the claim has been explicitly rejected by another doctrine, either of
federal jurisdiction or perhaps preclusion. This would be a novel proposal, one not generally accepted in other areas of the law. Consider,
for example, the relationship in contract law between consideration
and reliance-based recovery. Under Friedman and Gaylord's approach, reliance-based recovery might be improper because the basis
of liability, a promise made without consideration, had been rejected
as a matter of contract doctrine for reasons arguably central to that
doctrine. More generally, legal development often occurs when an
innovation is rejected under one legal doctrine for reasons the courts
view as necessary to protect important interests and is then accepted
under another, either a different preexisting doctrine or a newly created one.
48

See Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 45, at 1131-32.

49
50
51

See ia- at 1141.
See id. at 1140-43.
Id. at 1140.
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Another theoretical problem with this approach is that there is
no obvious reason why Rooker-Feldman should not be viewed as the
core doctrine with abstention and preclusion occupying a peripheral,
secondary position. Rooker-Feldman, after all, purports to be based
upon the best reading of the statutes specifying the jurisdiction of the
federal courts. If one takes this basis of Rooker-Feldman seriously, then
whatever interests Rooker-Feldmanadvances would be, by definition, legitimate federal jurisdiction interests, and the fact that the same argument had been rejected under abstention or preclusion would not be
persuasive. To use Friedman and Gaylord's example, just because due
process cuts against binding a nonparty to ajudgment does not mean
that due process requires that Congress open the federal courts to
suits by nonparties after the identical issue was litigated in state
courts.5 2 Perhaps due process would require that some forum be open
to the claim, but presumably state courts could provide due process.
In more general terms, I am not aware of criteria for deciding
when the limits of one doctrine should be understood to foreclose a
contrary decision under another doctrine. For example, should the
rejection of a claim under tort law bar a similar claim under contract
law, even if recognizing the contract claim would undercut the very
interest protected by the rejection of the tort claim? The theoretical
question here is why the interest protected by the rejection of the tort
claim should be privileged when it comes to the contract claim, where
a court might want to protect a different interest and use contract law
to do it. The only obvious answer to this difficulty might be that the
first interest protected in time should prevail, but I find that possibility unsatisfying given the random timing with which disputes may
reach the courts.
Another difficulty with applying a presumption that a second doctrine should not be used to undercut interests protected under a prior
doctrine is that courts (or commentators such as myself) might find it
very difficult to distinguish between rejections based on interests that
should be protected generally and rejections that are internal to the
particulars of the doctrine. To go back to the contract doctrine example, what are the criteria for determining whether the consideration
requirement protects an interest of the promisor that should not be
undercut by some other doctrine, or whether traditional contract doctrine rejected reliance liability simply because such liability did not fit
analytically into the doctrine?
To use an example closer to the issues surrounding Rooker-Feldman, think about how difficult it may be to determine whether Rooker52

See id. at 1141-42.
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Feldman should apply in a case where abstention would not. A court
may decline to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction for many reasons, a common pair of which are: (1) because it believes it should
exercise the jurisdiction granted by Congress unless absolutely necessary; or (2) because in the particular case the court finds that the
plaintiff has a substantial interest in pursuing her, claim in federal
court. If the refusal to abstain was based on the former reason, there
would be no problem with applying Rooker-Feldman to bar the case,
since the case would by definition not be within congressionally
granted jurisdiction. However, if the reason for not abstaining was the
latter, then an application of Rooker-Feldmanwould undercut the plaintiff's strong interest in choosing the federal forum. Given the way
opinions are written in the federal courts, both types of justifications
may appear in an opinion rejecting an abstention defense. Thus, it
may often be very difficult to know whether Rooker-Feldman should be
available.
Thus, while I am largely in agreement with Friedman and Gaylord that Rooker-Feldman is redundant and may undercut values that
support other doctrines of federal jurisdiction, we need clearer normative criteria to support our suspicions of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. For example, suppose a state's preclusion rules reject applying
claim preclusion against nonparties for reasons sounding in due process. Does that mean that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine should never
close the federal courts to a claim by a nonparty? More broadly,
would repealing the general federal question jurisdiction statute, or
imposing a high jurisdictional amount, violate due process? I think
not, and the problem is that the values underlying any particular doctrine may look quite different when viewed through a slightly different
doctrinal lens.
Friedman and Gaylord find a sufficient normative basis to apply
Rooker-Feldman to one class of cases, those in which a plaintiff files in
state court and then abandons the state forum after getting the sense
that the state court would rule against her claim. 53 They argue that
there is a state interest in preventing plaintiffs from "toying with state
courts by filing suits then dismissing if things do not go as they
55
wish." 54 Friedman and Gaylord discuss Chan Tse Ming v. Cordis Corp.,
in which a state plaintiff abandoned the state courts after an unfavorable choice of law ruling and refiled in federal court.5 6 They point out
53

See id at 1155-56.

54 I& at 1155.
55 704 F. Supp. 217 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
56 See i&L at 218.
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that the local rules of the state trial court for the county in which the
case had been filed allowed the presiding judge to reassign the case to
the original judge had the plaintiff refiled in the same court, and that
this structural protection is not available when the plaintiff refiles in
57
federal court.
Although Friedman and Gaylord do not argue it this way, the
strongest argument against allowing the federal claim to go forward
seems to be that allowing refiling in the federal forum appears to undercut the state court's interest in not allowing voluntary dismissal to
be used as a device for changing venue when no grounds for an ordinary change of venue exist. Add to that the special circumstance that
there is always a federal court alternative to a state court in which
venue and personal jurisdiction are proper, while it is somewhat less
likely that there will be a second state court system in which both jurisdiction and venue would be proper, and they may have identified a
unique federal threat to state courts. Further, Friedman and Gaylord
may be correct that we should not expect states to have developed
bodies of law on the circumstances under which a voluntarily dismissed case may be refiled and litigated in another forum, because
the existence of a parallel state court in which both jurisdiction and
58
venue are proper is much less likely than with a federal court.
Even in light of this possibility, I am still unconvinced, for several
reasons, that Rooker-Feldman should bar the federal filing after voluntary dismissal in the state court. I do not see any reason for federal
courts to be more restrictive than state courts over litigation following
uncompleted state proceedings. In my view, the federal forum should
be presumptively available as long as state law would not prevent the
case from being brought in another state or if there are devices available to the plaintiff to bring the case in a different court in the original state. Here, it is important to me that the presiding judge in the
county in which Chan Tse Mingwas litigated is not required to reassign
the case to the original judge if the plaintiff happens to refile in state
court. Further, some state courts may not have the rule in Chan Tse
Ming, and in those states there is no good argument for applying
Rooker-Feldman when state law would allow refiling in any court assuming jurisdiction and venue were proper. Often, venue lies in more
than one court within a state, and jurisdiction and venue may lie in
the courts of more than one state. If litigation in federal courts following state court voluntary dismissal became a serious problem, the
state courts could react perhaps by structuring a doctrine of interjuris57
58

See Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 45, at 1157-58.
See id.
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dictional comity under which sister states would not hear such cases
under circumstances in which the courts agree that the plaintiff
should have to live with the initial choice of forum. If a case is otherwise within federal jurisdiction, then as long as state law would not
preclude a second action following abandonment of the first state forum, Friedman and Gaylord need to offer a better argument in support of a special rule when the second forum happens to be federal.
A final thought on Friedman and Gaylord's argument in favor of
Rooker-Feldman for voluntary state plaintiffs is that I don't see what
such cases have to do with Rooker-Feldman at all. A federal action following the voluntary dismissal of a state action would not be an "appeal" from the state action in any sense of the word, but would rather
be an original action cognizable in a trial, not appellate, court. Even
if it were desirable to create a federal doctrine to prevent state plaintiffs from taking advantage of the dual court system in the way Friedman and Gaylord identify, it does not appear to me to be a matter
within the purview of Rooker-Feldman.
Susan Bandes' paper 59 focuses directly on the jurisdictional nature of the Rooker-Feldmandoctrine and she concludes that Rooker-Feldman should have jurisdictional status only when "litigants ask the
federal courts to rehear issues identical to those on which they have
already obtained state court decisions or, in other words, those situations in which an appeal would lie. ' 60 Insofar as this would amount to

a rather narrow Rooker-Feldman doctrine, it sounds attractive, but my
initial reaction is to wonder why preclusion rules won't take care of
this situation and, if so, why advocate maintaining Rooker-Feldman?
Bandes' normative distaste for Rooker-Feldman is built around a
familiar liberal preference for federal jurisdiction over federal claims.
She notes that "section 1331 .

.

. reflect[s] a congressional judgment

that state court vehicles for the vindication of federal rights and interests are inadequate." 61 It is tempting to jump on this bandwagon, but
I don't think that what's particularly wrong with the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine is that it fails to pay sufficient heed to congressional judgments underlying § 1331. After all, the Supreme Court relies upon
§ 1331 as a basis for Rooker-Feldman, so it must be that in the Court's
view the congressional policies underlying § 1331 do not, all things
considered, favor federal jurisdiction over those cases covered by
59

Susan Bandes, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: EvaluatingItsJurisdictionalStatus,

74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1175 (1999).
60 Id. at 1179.
61

Id. at 1187 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994)).
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Rooker-Feldman.62 Further, so many doctrines-from preclusion to abstention to the well-pleaded complaint rule to the ban on habeas
corpus for Fourth Amendment claims-keep cases out of federal
court that it is too simplistic to rely upon a general preference for
federal jurisdiction over violations of federal rights.
Bandes rightly directs our attention back to the statutory bases for
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and explains that we need to accept two
negative inferences if we are to accept the statutory bases for the doctrine. 63 The two inferences are, first, that because the Supreme Court
is granted, in 28 U.S.C. § 1257, appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of the highest state courts, appellate jurisdiction over such cases
is denied to any other federal tribunal. Second, it is inferred from
§ 1331's grant to the district courts of "original jurisdiction" over
claims arising under federal law that the district courts lack appellate
64
jurisdiction.
Bandes attacks these bases for Rooker-Feldman on the ground that
many claims barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, at least in the
lower federal courts, are not "appeals" within the ordinary sense of the
word since the federal litigant is not attempting to relitigate the exact
same claim litigated in the state court. 65 Of course, no federal litigant
is foolish enough to file papers in federal district court titled "appeal
from the decision of the state court." Bandes proposes that the only
claim that is truly an appeal disguised as an original action is a complaint asking a federal court to adjudicate the exact issues adjudicated
in state court.6 6 She points out that extensions of Rooker-Feldman to
claims not actually litigated, and against parties not part of the state
proceedings, are not proper because these are not appeals but rather
are the kinds of cases that might be affected by another doctrine such
as preclusion. 67 In this way, Bandes attacks Rooker-Feldman on its own
turf and argues that if Rooker-Feldman is truly based upon § 1257 and
§ 1331, then many of the lower court extensions of Rooker-Feldman are

62

This argument does not apply to those applications of Rooker-Feldman in the

lower courts that depart substantially from any plausible set of inferences from the
federal jurisdiction statutes. In such cases, a preference for following Congress's
grant of federal jurisdiction would point against applying Rooker-Feldman.
63 See Bandes, supra note 59, at 1189-90.
64 To this should be added § 1332's grant of original jurisdiction to the district
courts of diversity jurisdiction.

65
66

See id. at 1192.
See id.

67

See id.
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illegitimate because the cases barred under Rooker-Feldman are not
68
truly appeals of a state court judgment.
The statutory bases of Rooker-Feldmanmay actually give rise to an
even greater narrowing, or perhaps virtual elimination, of the RookerFeldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine appears to rest upon
the use of the word "original" in § 1331 and the grant ofjurisdiction
to the Supreme Court to review the decisions of the highest state
courts in § 1257. But in my view, these provisions have much less
meaning than the Rooker-Feldman doctrine ascribes to them. They are
permissive, not restrictive. Section 1257 grants an appeal that would
not otherwise lie, since it is novel to allow an appeal of a final judgment of the highest court of a jurisdiction.to any other court. Section
1331's use of the word "original" should be understood merely to direct plaintiffs to the proper court to file their cases. No longer is
there "original" jurisdiction over civil cases in a higher court over
larger diversity actions as there was in earlier times, such as the circuit
court's jurisdiction under § 10 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The language in § 1331 that should be understood as establishing the limits
on federal jurisdiction is the limitation of the original jurisdiction to
"all civil actions arisingunder the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States."16 9 If, for example, a claim that a state judgment violates a federal right, brought against a party to that action in state court and
perhaps also against the state judge or other court official, is a civil
action arising under federal law, then it is within the district court's
jurisdiction even if ultimately some preclusion or abstention doctrine
70
means that the claim will not succeed.
This argument is related to but does not depend upon my previous argument that a suit in equity to enjoin the enforcement of a
judgment is a proper original action and not an appeal from that
judgment. It would be important in this context in response to an
argument that the problem is not with the word "original," but rather
that an attack on a state judgment is not a "civil action" within the
meaning of the district court jurisdictional statutes. In my view, a suit
in equity to enjoin the operation of a state court judgment is a civil
action because that is precisely the sort of case traditionally brought to
71
a court of equity.

68

See id.

69

28 U.S.C. §1331 (1994) (emphasis added).

70 A similar analysis applies to the diversity statute and to the application of
Rooker-Feldman to diversity cases.
71 One complication here is that, especially with the merger of law and equity,
and in light of preclusion principles, it may be that the attack on the judgment might
be confined, as a matter of state procedure, to a motion for relief from the judgment

1230

NOTRE DAME

LAW REVIEW

[V€OL. 74:4

This understanding of the statutory bases helps explain why the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine should not bar § 1983 cases. Section 1983
cases are within federal district court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343(a) (3), which grants jurisdiction over cases "[t]o redress the
deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by
the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States." 7 2 This language is similar to the language of
§ 1983 itself.73 Recall that in Mitchum v. Foster,74 in deciding that
§ 1983 was an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, the Court stated
that the purpose of § 1983 was "to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law, 'whether that action be executive, legislative or judicial.'"7 5 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine would
virtually prevent § 1983 from protecting people from judicial action
because a large proportion of cases against judicial action would be
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 76 However, because § 1983 has
its own jurisdictional provision-28 U.S.C. § 1343-the Court's reading of the general federal question statute in Rooker does not necessarily govern. Even though § 1343, like § 1331, grants to the district
courts "original" jurisdiction, if "original" is merely permissive, directing litigants that they should file their cases in federal district
court, then as long as a claim otherwise met the requirements for federal jurisdiction the fact that it followed state court litigation, and peror some other collateral proceeding in the court in which the judgment was ren-

dered, or that equitable defenses must be raised in the same case rather than in a new
proceeding. In such a case, given my preference for following state law, there may
not be a separate civil action unless a separate action were allowed in state court. One
way to resolve this difficulty may be to examine the practice when two states are involved and require the federal court to follow the practice of the second state.
72 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3)(1994).
73 Here is where I believe that Williamson Chang errs when he states, as Bandes
reports, that § 1983 is not an exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because it is
notjurisdictional. See Chang, supranote 2, at 1367, cited in Bandes, supranote 59 at n.
13. This ignores the fact that § 1343's language mirrors the language of § 1983, and
§ 1343 is jurisdictional.
74 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
75 Id. at 242 (quoting ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879)) (emphasis
added).
76 Suits against state judges for actions taken in nonjudicial capacities, such as
hiring and firing of clerical help, would not be understood as claims against state
judicial action. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988). The only § 1983 claims

that would be understood as challenges to judicial action would be claims directed at
judicial decisionmaking, most of which would be barred by expansive understandings

of Rooker-Feldman.

1999]

COMMENTS

ON ROOKER-FELDMAN"

haps even attacked the results of that litigation, would not affect
77
federal jurisdiction.
Bandes also appears to endorse Rooker-Feldman's federalization of
the characterization of claims for the purpose of determining whether
a claim is subject to Rooker-Feldman.7 8 Her focus is on whether the
state's decision is judicial in nature and she says that "because RockerFeldman is styled as jurisdictional, the federal courts cannot inquire
whether the state proceedings were judicial under state laws, but must
use a uniform federal standard.17 9 But why? For example, if a state
would not characterize its proceedings as judicial and thus would not
apply preclusion doctrines to the proceedings, then why should a federal court, allegedly motivated by the desire to protect the judgments
of state courts from federal oversight, characterize them asjudicial? I
can think of no sound federalism-based reason for a federal court to
give Rooker-Feldman protection to the decisions of a tribunal that the
state itself does not consider judicial.
Bandes points out an important continuing aspect of our federal

system, that concurrent jurisdiction over claims is normal, not abnormal as Rooker-Feldman might make it out to be.80 In fact, there are
some claims over which many different state and federal courts might
have subject matter and personal jurisdiction. Some states have rules
permitting the dismissal of an action on the ground that another action on the identical occurrence is pending in another court.8 1 No
such rule exists in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, perhaps recognizing that it is a fact of life in our system that two cases on the same
occurrence may race to judgment, with preclusion rules barring the
slower claim but only after the faster claim came to judgment.
According to Bandes, "the Rooker-Feldman doctrine can claim jurisdictional status only in the very narrow situations in which litigants
ask the federal courts to rehear issues identical to those on which they
have already obtained state court decision, or in other words, those
situations in which an appeal would lie. '8 2 I do not understand why

this is a jurisdictional matter. Between two states, the second state
would rule against the plaintiff (assuming all usual prerequisites are
met) on claim preclusion grounds, not for lack of jurisdiction. In my
view, it is not an appeal when a person sues in federal court over a
77 Issue and claim preclusion might apply, and judicial immunity might bar damages claims against state judges, but Rooker-Feldman would not affect jurisdiction.
78 See Bandes, supra note 59, at 1196.

79

Id.

80

See id. at 1203-04.

81

See, e.g., ILL. CoMp. STAT. ANN. 5/2-619(3) (West
Bandes, supra note 59, at 1179.

82

1993).
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transaction or occurrence that was already the subject of a state court
suit, it is simply a civil action that is barred by the merits defense of
claim preclusion. An appeal, by contrast, would allege an error in a
lower court, not a claim for liability based upon a nonjudicial transaction or occurrence. It is never an appeal when the federal plaintiff
alleges facts that occurred outside of the state court and asks for relief
directed, not at the state judgment, but rather at the state defendant.
83
In this regard, I cannot resist mentioning the Kamilewicz case,
which has become a cause c61Rbre among law professors. The Seventh Circuit's decision that Rooker-Feldman bars a malpractice claim
against class counsel by members of a class deserves condemnation, as
do, in my view, class action rules that allow a plaintiff with no contacts
to the forum state to be bound by a judgment entered in that state
after notice by mail that the class member may have neither read nor
understood.8 4 But the real evil of the Kamilewicz decision may be that
it characterizes as 'judicial" the decisions of a tribunal that would approve a settlement in which the lawyers for the plaintiffs insisted that
they receive their fees from their own clients rather than from the
defendants and in which some plaintiffs were worse off for having
been members of the class. It impugns the reputation ofjudicial bod-

83 Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996).
84 Perhaps the implicit acknowledgment in Rooker that the Indiana court's judgment would not bar the federal claim if the Indiana court had been withoutjurisdiction should have led the Seventh Circuit to allow the Kamilewicz case to go forward on
the theory that insofar as counsel were attempting to collect fees from the class in the
Alabama courts, they needed a better basis for personal jurisdiction over their clients
than the letter sent to class members informing them of the settlement and their
rights under it, at least for clients lacking minimum contacts with Alabama. Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), is one of the roots of this evil, for in that
case the Supreme Court held that parties without minimum contacts with a jurisdiction can nonetheless be bound by judgments in certain class actions as long as they
received sufficient notice of their rights as class members, including the right to opt
out of the class. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the class members in
Kamilewicz were in the position of defendants with regard to the attorneys' fees issue,
but still held them bound by the Alabama judgment, or at least required them to seek
relief from thatjudgment in an Alabama court, not a federal court. See Kamilewicz, 92
F.3d at 511. Interestingly, the Alabama courts, according to the Seventh Circuit,
would allow an independent action to set aside a judgment for fraud. See id. ("Alabama has a procedure by which a litigant can assert an independent action for fraud
upon the court within three years of the entry of the fraudulently induced judgment."). In my view, the existence of this independent state court action counsels
strongly against applying Rooker-Feldman to bar the claim in federal court.
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ies everywhere to characterize a tribunal that would approve that set85
tlement as judicial.
Bandes' ultimate conclusion, with which I agree, is that the federal jurisdictional statutes do not provide adequate support for the
86
Rooker-Feldman doctrine as built out by the lower federal courts. It
may be that the doctrine should be abandoned altogether. The argument for Rooker-Feldman depends too greatly on negative inferences
from permissive language. However, that said, it seems to me that it is
very unlikely that either Congress or the Court will overrule the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. What would a statute overruling Rooker-Feldman say? Is the Supreme Court likely to admit that "we erred when we
held that lower federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear appeals from
state courtjudgments"? What appears more likely is that the Supreme
Court will someday take a case in which the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
was applied broadly, perhaps to bar a nonparty from raising issues that
were previously litigated in state court, and the Court will adhere to
the relatively narrow limits that it has set forth for the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. Then, after a few years of further developments, we can all
get together again to debate the merits of the lower federal courts'
latest excuse for giving state judgments greater preclusive effect than
would be given by the courts of the rendering state.

85 Because the plaintiffs in the federal Kamilewicz case were attacking the effects
of the state court judgment, the case is a candidate for abstention under the minimalist Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine I outlined at the outset of this Comment.
Nonetheless, I do not think that the federal court should have abstained in the particular case for several reasons. First, a federal court should not abstain when the party
bringing the federal claim was not subject to the jurisdiction of the state court, and
once the federal court decided that the class members were defendants regarding the
fees, the class notice should not have been sufficient to give the Alabama courts jurisdiction over class members with no other contacts with Alabama. Second, since Alabama would entertain an independent action to attack the judgment for fraud, the
federal court should not abstain from hearing the same claim as long as a sufficient
basis for federal jurisdiction exists. Judge Easterbrook, dissenting in Kamilewicz from
the denial of rehearing en banc, relied mainly on the lack of jurisdiction over the
plaintiffs and on an exception to Rooker-Feldman he would recognize for malpractice
actions against the attorneys in the state case. See Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp,
100 F.3d 1348 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook,J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc).
86 See Bandes, supra note 59, at 1207.
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